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Abstract: A number of commentators have suggested that in the final 
chapters of his De immortalitate animae Pietro Pomponazzi drew on Stoic 
themes in developing his ethical claims regarding the autonomy of virtue. I 
argue against both the claim that he was especially influenced by Stoicism 
here and the claim that he was asserting the autonomy of ethics from 
religious or metaphysical concerns. Instead I argue that we ought to take 
Pomponazzi’s ethical reflections as a response to Aristotle’s discussion, 
towards the end of the Nicomachean Ethics, of the relative status of the political 
and the contemplative life. We also ought to see them as a corollary to his 
interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the soul in the earlier chapters of the 
work.  
 
Pietro Pomponazzi’s De immortalitate animae, first published in 1516,1 argues 
that it is impossible by the use of reason alone to argue for the soul’s 
immortality. Pomponazzi’s targets are those who have argued that Aristotle 
held that the soul or the intellect is immortal (in particular, Averroes and 
Thomas Aquinas), as well as other philosophical positions that claim that 
such a thesis can be established by reason (such as that of Marsilio Ficino). 
After having dealt with these opponents and laid out his own view, in the 
final chapters of the book Pomponazzi turns to consider the ethical 																																																								
1 Pomponazzi’s Tractatus de immortalitate animae (hereafter Imm. An.) was first published in 
Bologna 1516 and reprinted in his Tractatus acutissimi utillimi et mere peripatetici, Venice 1525, 
which collected together all of his works published up to that date. Here I have relied on the 
recent critical edition by Thierry Gontier (Traité de l’immortalité de l’âme / Tractatus de 
immortalitate animae, Texte établi, traduit, présenté et annoté par Thierry Gontier, Paris 
2012), which includes a list of previous editions (pp. lxxv-lxxvi). To that list one can now 
add the new edition of the collected works with facing Italian translation: Tutti I Trattati 
Peripatetici, Testo latino a fronte, Monografia introduttiva, testo critico e note di Francesco 
Paolo Raimondi e di José Manuel García Valverde, Traduzione di Francesco Paolo 
Raimondi, Milano 2013. I have also made use of the translation into English by W. H. Hay 
II in E. Cassirer – P. O. Kristeller – J. H. Randall (eds), The Renaissance Philosophy of Man 
(hereafter CKR), Chicago 1948, pp. 280-381.  
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implications of his project. In particular, he attempts to respond to critics 
who are concerned about the implications for ethics of denying the soul’s 
immortality. He argues, among other things, that our ethical behaviour 
need not require threat of post-mortem punishment or reward. This has led 
some commentators to suggest that Pomponazzi asserts the autonomy of 
ethics from religious or metaphysical issues, making him in some respects a 
precursor of Immanuel Kant.2  
 
Other commentators have suggested that this focus on the idea that virtue is 
its own reward signals a shift in this predominantly Aristotelian work 
towards Stoicism. Thus, John Randall described Pomponazzi’s position as 
“a thoroughly naturalistic ethics [that] owes more to the Stoics than to 
Aristotle”.3 Before Randall, Léontine Zanta, in her study of Stoicism in the 
sixteenth century, located Pomponazzi within the revival of Stoicism during 
that period.4 These claims are based, in part, on the fact that Pomponazzi 
refers to Seneca in his discussion of the autonomy of virtue.5  
 
In what follows I argue against both the claim that Pomponazzi was 
asserting the autonomy of ethics and the claim that he was especially 
influenced by Stoicism in the De immortalitate animae. Although Pomponazzi 
did pay close attention to Stoicism elsewhere, in his De fato, de libero arbitrio et 
																																																								
2 See A. H. Douglas, The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi, Cambridge 1910, pp. 
257, 267.  
3 J. H. Randall, The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science, Padova 1961, p. 99. 
(This remark is reprinted in Randall’s introduction to Pomponazzi in CKR, p. 274.)    
4 See L. Zanta, La renaissance du Stoïcisme au XVIe siècle, Paris 1914, pp. 33-46.  
5 As we shall see, Pomponazzi refers to Seneca just once, at Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 205, CKR 
374), where he mentions Ep. 54 and Cons. Marc. Editors of Imm. An. have noted what they 
take to be allusions to Seneca at various other places in the text, but none of these are close 
textual parallels.  
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de praedestinatione,6 his single reference to Seneca is hardly enough to show a 
Stoic influence here. Paul Oskar Kristeller argued, perhaps rightly, that 
when Pomponazzi referred to Seneca in the De immortalitate animae, he was 
merely using Seneca as an example. Yet Kristeller went on to claim that 
there was a Platonic influence at work there instead.7 On this issue, of 
course, there is no great distance between Plato and the Stoics, but both 
suggestions distract us from the central preoccupation in the final chapters, 
namely a discussion of the competing ideals of the active and contemplative 
lives that we find towards the end of the Nicomachean Ethics. As we shall see, 
Pomponazzi comes down resolutely in favour of the former – the active life 
– and sees this as the natural corollary of his strongly biological reading of 
Aristotle’s account of the soul earlier in the text. I shall argue, then, that 
what we find in Pomponazzi is not a turn to Stoic or even Platonic ethics, 
but rather a somewhat heterodox reading of Aristotle’s ethics that does to 
the Nicomachean Ethics what the earlier parts of the work have done to the De 
Anima, namely offer a thoroughly naturalistic interpretation that insists on 
interpreting Aristotle as a whole rather than focus on the letter of particular 
passages taken out of that much wider context.  
 
Let us now turn to Pomponazzi’s text. In Chapter 13 he lists a total of eight 
objections that might be raised against his central claims regarding the soul. 
These are: i) if the human soul is mortal, there will be no final end for man, 
and thus he will be incapable of happiness; ii) if the soul is mortal, no one 
																																																								
6 This work was completed not long after Imm. An. but was only published posthumously in 
1567. For a modern edition see Petri Pomponatii Mantuani libri quinque de fato, de libero arbitrio et 
de praedestinatione, edidit Richard Lemay, Lucani 1957. On its discussion of Stoicism see J. 
Kraye, Stoicism in the Philosophy of the Italian Renaissance, in J. Sellars (ed.), The Routledge 
Handbook of the Stoic Tradition, Abingdon 2016, pp. 133-44, at pp. 140-42.  
7 See P. O. Kristeller, Aristotelismo e sincretismo nel pensiero di Pietro Pomponazzi, Padova 1983, 
pp. 10-11. Note also the comments on Kristeller’s interpretation in M. L. Pine, Paul Oskar 
Kristeller on Renaissance Scholasticism, in J. Monfasani (ed.), Kristeller Reconsidered: Essays on his Life 
and Scholarship, New York 2006, pp. 213-21, at p. 220.  
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would ever be courageous; iii) it implies that God either does not govern the 
world or that he is unjust; iv) it goes against all religions, which teach that 
the soul remains after the body; v) it goes against many experiences that 
suggest the soul is immortal; vi) it is contradicted by the fact that some 
people are disturbed by demons, which are the souls of dead men; vii) it 
contradicts Aristotle, who thinks that souls are immortal; viii) only the 
impious have claimed that the soul is mortal. In Chapter 14 he goes on to 
respond to each of these in turn. Here I shall focus on his responses to three 
of those objections, for it is in these that he makes his central points. These 
are:  
 
1. A discussion of human function that establishes the centrality of 
virtue in human life, in reply to Objection 1.8  
2. A discussion of the claim that virtue is its own reward, in reply to 
Objection 3.9  
3. Examples of ‘virtuous atheists’, in reply to Objection 8.10  
 
Pomponazzi opens his discussion by insisting that while each thing must 
have its own end, its end must be suitable to its nature.11 Although it would 
be better to have sensation than not, that does not mean that sensation 
would be suitable for, say, a stone, for it would be against its nature. 
Likewise for humans: although it might seem preferable to attribute divine 
properties to humans, it would in fact be a mistake, for it would be against 
human nature. At the same time, Pomponazzi insists that it is important to 
think about the end of the human race as a whole. He compares the human 																																																								
8 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 159-75, CKR 351-9).  
9 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 181-3, CKR 361-3).  
10 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 203-9, CKR 373-7). 
11 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 159, CKR 351): non tamen quod est magis bonum debet unicuique rei pro fine 
assignari, sed solum secundum quod convenit illi naturae et ei proportionatur.  
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race to a human body, comprised of different organs with different 
functions, each contributing to the wellbeing of the organism.12 This enables 
Pomponazzi to claim that different humans can fulfil some functions better 
than others, and that this diversity of abilities in fact contributes to the 
wellbeing of the human race taken as a whole.13 All human beings have a 
share of the theoretical (speculativo), practical (practico seu operativo), and 
productive (factivo) intellects, at varying degrees of perfection.14  
 
Of these three intellects, Pomponazzi claims that the theoretical intellect, 
although shared by humans to some degree, properly belongs to the gods. 
The productive intellect, the lowest, is something shared by both humans 
and animals. That leaves the practical intellect, which Pomponazzi says is 
“truly fitting for man”.15 It is only according to this practical intellect that a 
human being can be called unqualifiedly and absolutely (simpliciter et absolute) 
good or evil; according to the other two intellects, one can only be relatively 
(secundum quid) good or evil. Thus, a virtuous person is an absolutely good 
person, but an excellent metaphysician is merely that and an excellent 
builder is merely that; neither are automatically good examples of human 
beings. To be called a bad metaphysician does not challenge your integrity 
as a good human being, but to be called a liar or a thief does, Pomponazzi 
suggests. It is good for the human race as a whole that there are some people 
who excel at metaphysics, but we ought not to confuse that perfection of the 
theoretical intellect with the function of human beings in general. They are 																																																								
12 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 163, CKR 352): Universum namque humanum genus est sicut unum corpus ex 
diversis membris constitutum, quae et diversa habent officia, in communem tamen utilitatem generis humani 
ordinata. 
13 As R. Ramberti, La fondation de l’autonomie morale dans le De immortalitate animae et dans le De 
fato de Pietro Pomponazzi, in J. Biard – T. Gontier (eds), Pietro Pomponazzi entre traditions et 
innovations, Amsterdam 2009, pp. 135-52, notes (at p. 137), this has echoes of Plato’s Republic.  
14 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 163, CKR 353).  
15 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 167, CKR 355): Operativus autem intellectus vere convenit homini. 
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rare exceptions rather than a model to which all human beings should 
aspire.  
 
So, Pomponazzi suggests that while the human race collectively ought to 
aspire to the perfection of all three intellects – the theoretical, practical, and 
productive – each individual human being ought primarily to aspire to the 
practical intellect, which is most fitting for human beings (and, unlike the 
other two, unique to human beings). This will also contribute to the 
wellbeing of the human race as a whole, for human society requires that all 
its members act virtuously if it is to function well. By contrast, it would be 
highly undesirable for the human race as whole if everyone were a 
metaphysician, or, for that matter, a builder. The human race requires a 
diversity of talents in order to flourish. He writes:  
 
The universal end of the human race is to participate relatively 
in the speculative and the productive intellects but perfectly in 
the practical [intellect]. For the whole would be most perfectly 
preserved if all men were righteous and good, but not if all were 
philosophers or smiths or builders.16  
 
The proper end of human beings, then, is practical, and not theoretical or 
contemplative. For if everyone were engaged in the contemplative life, 
human communities would soon collapse. Moreover, although theoretical 
speculation might be the highest activity someone can engage in, it is not the 
foundation for human happiness. A farmer or a builder can, if he or she 
leads a moral life, genuinely be said to be happy.  
 																																																								
16 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 169, CKR 356): Quare universalis finis generis humani est secundum quid de 
speculativo et factivo participare, perfecte autem de practico. Universum enim perfectissime conservaretur si 
omnes homines essent studiosi et optimi, sed non si omnes essent philosophi vel fabri vel domificatores.  
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Pomponazzi concludes his discussion of human function by insisting that the 
ideal of a life devoted to contemplation is simply not appropriate to human 
beings in general, even if a handful of individuals might pursue it. Taking 
such individuals on their own, one might be tempted to say that they are 
following the best form of life to which a human being can aspire, but as 
soon as we place them within human society as a whole, we quickly see that 
this cannot be the best form of life for humans in general. The only form of 
life that benefits both human beings individually and human beings 
collectively is an active, practical life devoted to virtue.  
 
It is at the very end of this thoroughly Aristotelian discussion of human 
function and the choice between the active and contemplative lives that, it 
has been claimed, Pomponazzi echoes a passage from one of Seneca’s 
letters.17 Whether or not Seneca is in the background here, Pomponazzi 
simply makes the point that mortal human beings must at the end of their 
lives give back the goods they have received from Nature.  
 
Having insisted that the proper function of human beings is a practical life 
devoted to virtue, Pomponazzi goes on to argue that the essential reward of 
virtue is virtue itself.18 This is, as Gontier notes, a “thème caractéristique du 
stoïcisme” and he along with others note another parallel with Seneca here, 																																																								
17 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 175, CKR 358): nam et purgatoriam antiqui appellaverunt, cum ea lege 
receperit ut sciat naturae concessurum. Gratias deo et naturae aget, semperque erit paratus mori, neque 
mortem timebit, cum vanus sit timor de inevitabilibus, nihilque mali conspiciat in morte. The edition of 
Imm. An. by Mojsisch (Abhandlung über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Übersetzt und mit einer 
Einleitung herausgegeben von Burkhard Mojsisch, Hamburg 1990) and the Italian 
translation by Compagni (Trattato sull’immortalità dell’anima, A cura di Vittoria Perrone 
Compagni, Firenze 1999) both note Ep. 30.10 as a parallel here (so too Raimondi and 
Valverde cit., p. 2608), although it is not especially close. This and other echoes of Seneca 
(to be mentioned later) are not noted in earlier editions (e.g. De Immortalitate Animae, a cura di 
Giovanni Gentile, Messina – Roma 1925, and Tractatus de Immortalitate Animae, a cura di 
Gianfranco Morra, Bologna 1954), so perhaps they originate with Mojsisch. 
18 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 181, CKR 361): Praemium essentiale virtutis est ipsamet virtus, quae 
hominem faelicem facit.  
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this time from De beneficiis.19 Some have gone further in claiming that 
“Pomponazzi adopted the Stoic position that virtue was its own reward and 
vice its own punishment”20. However, this is by no means an exclusively 
Stoic position.21 A further passage has also been claimed as a second echo 
from Seneca’s letters,22 which we find alongside an explicit quotation from 
Plato,23 both of which are sandwiched between two references to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics. On this point, all these ancient philosophers follow 
Socrates in claiming that virtue is inherently beneficial and vice is its own 
punishment. Pomponazzi elaborates on this by saying that it is always better 
to act virtuously without hope of any reward, rather than to do so with the 
hope of some other benefit.24 To seek any reward other than virtue itself in 
some way diminishes a virtuous act. Even to receive accidently a great 
reward for a virtuous act might seem to diminish the purity of the act in 
some way. (Here one can see why some might take this to prefigure the view 
of Kant.) Pomponazzi concludes his fairly brief discussion not by turning to 
Seneca or Plato, but rather to Aristotle, to give authority for his claim that 
the noblest motivation is the love of virtue itself, and nothing external.25  
 
																																																								
19 See Gontier cit., p. 283. Both he and Mojsisch (cit., p. 251) direct readers to Seneca, Ben. 
4.1.  
20 J. Kraye, Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525): Secular Aristotelianism in the Renaissance, in P. R. 
Blum (ed.), Philosophers of the Renaissance, Washington DC 2010, pp. 92-115, at p. 101.  
21 As Compagni notes (cit., p. 96), one might equally think of Plato, Gorg. 506e-507e.  
22 Imm. An.  14 (Gontier 181, CKR 362): poena namque vitiosi est ipsum vitium, quo nihil miserius, 
nihil infaelicius esse potest. Mojsisch (cit., p. 251) and Compagni (cit., p. 97) compare this with 
Seneca, Ep. 87.24 (also Raimondi and Valverde cit., p. 2609), although again the parallel is 
not especially close.  
23 Pomponazzi names the Crito (Gontier 181, CKR 362), but in fact the passage he quotes 
comes from the Apology, 41d.  
24 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 183, CKR 363).  
25 Pomponazzi quotes from Diogenes Laertius’s biography of Aristotle, in Vitae philosophorum 
5.20, at Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 183, CKR 363).  
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It is because virtue is its own reward that Pomponazzi thinks he can 
challenge another potential objection. He denies that belief in the mortality 
of the soul necessarily leads to moral corruption. It is here that we do see 
some potentially Stoic themes appear. First, he says that there have been 
many people who did belief in the immortality of the soul who have acted 
viciously, usually due to the negative influence of emotions.26 Then, he says 
that there have been many examples of virtuous people who did hold the 
soul to be mortal,27 and here we touch on the theme of the virtuous atheist. 
Pomponazzi focuses on virtuous pagans rather than contemporary atheists, 
and it is here that we find Pomponazzi’s explicit references to Seneca,28 
whom he presents as someone who held both that the soul is mortal and that 
virtue is its own reward. But it is worth noting that although Seneca is 
singled out, he appears at the end of a list of names including a number of 
Greek and Arabic philosophers, and if he is singled out for a reason, it is not 
because he is a Stoic, but rather because Pomponazzi takes him to be one of 
his own countrymen.29  
 
It is in this discussion that we find a key passage that brings together all three 
themes that we have touched on:  
 
For since happiness is naturally desired and misery shunned, and 
by what has been said happiness consists in virtuous action, but 
misery in vicious action […] we ought hence to strive with all 																																																								
26 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 203, CKR 373): Manifeste enim videmus multos pravos homines credere 
legibus, verum ex passionibus seduci. 
27 Ibid.: Multos etiam viros sanctos et iustos scimus mortalitatem animarum posuisse. 
28 See Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 205, CKR 374), where he names Seneca, Ep. 54 (cf. 54.4) and 
Cons. Marc. (cf. 19.4-5).  
29 Pomponazzi ends his list with Pliny and Seneca, whom he calls nostratibus (Gontier 203), 
and which has been translated as ‘countrymen’ (CKR 374). One might read this as 
claiming that they were both Italians (ignoring Seneca’s Spanish origins) or, more loosely, 
that they were writers of Latin (as opposed to Greek or Arabic).  
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our powers to acquire them. But on the contrary, thefts, 
robberies, murders, a life of pleasures are vices, which make 
man turn into a beast and cease to be a man; hence we ought to 
abstain from them. And note that one who acts conscientiously, 
expecting no other reward than virtue, seems to act far more 
virtuously and purely than he who expects some reward beyond 
virtue. […] Wherefore those who claim that the soul is mortal 
seem better to save the grounds of virtue than those who claim it 
to be immortal.30  
 
Thus, rather than underwrite virtuous behaviour, belief in rewards or 
punishments in an afterlife actually undermine the purity of virtuous acts. By 
contrast, belief in a mortal soul in no way undermines virtue, so long as one 
combines it with the sort of function argument we have already seen 
Pomponazzi deploy. A life devoted to physical pleasures might be 
appropriate to an animal, but it is not a fitting life for a human. If vice is its 
own punishment, then no one – not even an atheist – will deliberately 
choose vice.  
 
In these ethical reflections, we can see the way in which Pomponazzi weaves 
these three arguments together to form a single, coherent position. There is 
a function appropriate to human beings alone, and that is a practical life 
devoted to virtue. The virtue that is the appropriate end for a human life is 
its own reward, and to pursue it with some other reward in mind as well 
compromises the purity of the virtuous act. Consequently, it is not necessary 																																																								
30 Imm. An. 14 (Gontier 205-7, CKR 374-5): Nam cum naturaliter faelicitas appetatur et miseria 
fugiatur – et, per dicta, faelicitas consistit in actu virtuoso, miseria vero in actu vitioso […] ideo debemus 
totis viribus inniti ad acquisitionem istorum. E contrario vero, furta, rapinae, homicidia, vita voluptuosa sunt 
vitia, quae faciunt hominem transire in bestiam et desinere esse hominem: ideo ab his abstinere debemus. Et 
animadvertas quod studiose operans, non expectans praemium aliud a virtute, longe virtuosius et magis 
ingenue videtur operari quam ille qui, ultra virtutem, praemium aliquod expectat; […] Quare perfectius 
asserentes animam mortalem melius videntur salvare rationem virtutis quam asserentes ipsam immortalem.   
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to believe in an immortal soul – in fact, in some ways it may be better not to 
do so – in order to be a virtuous human being.31  
 
How does all of this fit with Aristotle? Famously, Aristotle drew a distinction 
between three forms of life in the opening book of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
there is a life devoted to pleasure (ἡδονή), followed by most people, a 
political form of life (πολιτικός), and a contemplative form of life 
(θεωρητικός).32 Aristotle rejects the life devoted to pleasure out of hand, 
leaving just the practical, political form of life and the contemplative form of 
life, deferring discussion of the contemplative life until the end of the work, 
in Book 10.33 There, despite having spent much of the intervening space 
discussing the sorts of virtues that would constitute a practical, political form 
of life, we find the contemplative life presented as the highest ideal for 
humans.  
 
The activity of the highest virtue for humans is, he says, contemplation.34 
This is the most pleasant and the most self-sufficient of human activities. It is 
better than the political life because it is solely for its own sake and it is a life 
of leisure. Therefore, it offers complete happiness for humans. Although 
Aristotle then says that such a life would be too high for humans, more 
appropriate to a god than a human,35 I take this to be him entertaining an 
objection to his position, to which he then responds by saying that “we must 
not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, 																																																								
31 Belief in an immortal soul might compromise the purity of one’s virtuous actions if it 
leads them to be motivated by either desire for reward or fear of punishment in an afterlife.  
32 See Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1.5, 1095b14-19. I have relied on the Oxford Classical Text 
edition by I. Bywater, Oxford 1894, and quote from the translation into English by W. D. 
Ross, Oxford 1925.   
33 See Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 10.6-8.   
34 See Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 10.7, 1077a12-18.  
35 See Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 10.7, 1177b26-8.  
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being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves 
immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best in us”.36 
He then adds, “this would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the 
authoritative and better part of him”,37 adding that it would be strange not 
to choose this contemplative form of life. While he acknowledges that a 
practical life of virtue will also be a happy life, it will not be the happiest life 
because, he says, “perfect happiness is a contemplative activity”.38   
 
All this has struck many commentators as paradoxical: the best form of life 
for a human is in some sense higher than human. Aristotle’s prioritization of 
the contemplative life depends upon the claim that there is an element of the 
divine within us (the active intellect), and that in a sense this is who we really 
are – the activity of reason. But Pomponazzi has of course rejected this 
version of Aristotle’s psychology, insisting that while the human soul may be 
said to be relatively immortal (secundum quid immortalis), it is nevertheless 
unqualifiedly mortal (simpliciter mortalis).39 For Pomponazzi, humans are 
unequivocally embodied biological creatures,40 social animals who are by 
nature parts of a community. For creatures such as these, the best form of 
life, as he has argued, is a practical life of virtue. Although he differs from 
Aristotle’s explicit statements in the Nicomachean Ethics, this can hardly be 																																																								
36 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 10.7, 1177b31-4: οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα 
φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ 
πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ. 
37 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 10.7, 1178a2-3: δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον 
καὶ ἄμεινον.  
38 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 10.8, 1178b7-8: ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητική τις ἐστὶν 
ἐνέργεια. 
39 Imm. An. 9 (Gontier 79, CKR 313). For further discussion see J. Sellars, Pomponazzi contra 
Averroes on the Intellect, “British Journal for the History of Philosophy” XXIV (2016), 1, pp. 
45-66.  
40 As Ernst Cassirer commented, Pomponazzi “pays homage to Aristotle the biologist rather 
than to Aristotle the metaphysician”. See E. Cassirer, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der 
Renaissance, Darmstadt 1977 (repr. Leipzig 1927), p. 148; translated as The Individual and the 
Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, Oxford 1963, p. 140.  
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called un-Aristotelian. One commentator has described it as “una 
radicalizzazione dell’etica aristotelica”41.  
 
By way of conclusion, then, Pomponazzi’s account of ethics remains 
thoroughly Aristotelian. It builds upon his own interpretation of the De 
Anima in the preceding chapters of De immortalitate animae and, in the light of 
that, opts for Aristotle’s own image of the political life over that of the 
contemplative life. He is, in effect, engaged in an argument within Aristotle 
rather than in one against him. Although his claim that virtue is its own 
reward might lead one to think that he is insisting on the autonomy of 
ethics, his own remarks at the very end of the book seem to undercut this. 
Pomponazzi insists in the concluding chapter that his reflections on ethics 
come straight out of his concerns with the immortality of the soul. As he puts 
it, “if the soul is immortal, earthly things are to be despised, and eternal 
things to be pursued; but if its existence is mortal, a contrary way is to be 
pursued”42. The mortality of the soul confirms the proper function of 
humankind, namely to pursue a practical life of virtue. So, Pomponazzi 
thinks that there are direct ethical implications from his metaphysical 
reflections on the nature of the soul. This is, in part, why the metaphysical 




41 E. Cuttini, Pomponazzi e Aristotele: Il problema del fine dell’uomo, in M. Sgarbi (a cura di), Pietro 
Pomponazzi: Tradizione e dissenso, Firenze 2010, pp. 261-70, at p. 270.  
42 Imm. An. 15 (Gontier 211, CKR 378): Unde si anima est immortalis, terrena despicienda sunt et 
aeterna prosequenda; at si mortalis existat, contrarius modus prosequendus est. 
